Defending Longinos Social Epistemology :: Science Scientific Philosophical Papers

Defending Longinos Social Epistemology (1)ABSTRACT Though numerous agree that we need to account for the enjoyment that neighborly factors play in query, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be a difficult task. According to Longino, it is the processes that make interrogatory possible that atomic number 18 aptly described as social, for they require a number of people to harbour them. These processes not only facilitate interrogatory, but also ensure that the results of inquiry argon more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called knowledge. In this paper, I explain Longinos epistemology and defend it against criticisms recently elevated by Kitcher, Schmitt and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the comparable (adverse) effect on inquiry. She also recommends that we reconceptualize knowledge, distinguishing knowledge from opinion by prolongation to a social standard. Though it is agreed that epistemologi sts need to account for the role social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be a difficult task. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that argon social, requiring a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called knowledge. Here, I want to both explain and defend Longinos epistemology.ILongino defines her account of scientific knowledge relative to positivist and wholist accounts. Though many regard positivism as offering an untenable account of science, because no comparable move and detailed philosophical view has replaced it, Longino believes that it still needs to be reckoned with (L1990, 21). Wholists are significant because they have been the greatest critics of positivism. After pitching these accounts, and explaining the difficulties that Longi no has with them, I will present Longinos own account of scientific knowledge and inquiry.This discussion focuses on 2 issues the relationship between evidence and hypotheses and, the role of contextual values in inquiry. Longino contrasts contextual values with constitutive values. The latter, the values generated from an understanding of the goals of scientific inquiry, are the source of the rules determining what constitutes acceptable scientific practice or scientific method (L1990, 4). That these values influence inquiry is not a problem. merely the former, personal, social, and cultural values, are thought to threaten the integrity of scientific inquiry (L1990, 4-5).According to positivists, the fundamental base of inquiry, the source of confirming or electronegative instances, is a set of .